ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Consider a simple experiment with a six-faced die. Suppose the die is thoroughly shaken and placed on a table covered with a box and you are 166 Nikhil R. Pal, James C. Bezdek, and Rohan Hemasinha asked to guess the top face of the die. To answer this question one faces a type of uncertainty that can be attributed to randomness present in the system (experiment). The best answer to this question might be to describe the status of the die in terms of a probability distribution over the different faces (if known). Uncertainty that arises due to randomness in the system is called probabilistic uncertainty.
To make the system more complex, suppose an artificial vision system analyzes a digital image of the die and, based on the evidence gathered, suggests that the top face is 5 or 6 with a belief value (confidence) of, say, 0.8. In other words, based on the evidence the system is not able to specify the top face of the die exactly. This kind of uncertainty usually arises due to limitations of the evidence gathering and interpretation system. Uncertainty in this second situation is due to a difficulty in specifying the exact solution and is called nonspecificity in the literature.
Finally, suppose you are asked to interpret the top most face of the die as, high or low. In this case a different type of uncertainty (ambiguity) is faced. Here the existence of a fuzzy event high is assumed and one has to gauge the extent to which this event has occurred. In a probabilistic experiment, an event either occurs or not, but here an event may occur partially. This type of uncertainty arises due to the presence of fuzziness in the system.
It is clear that fuzzy uncertainty differs from probability and nonspecificity. Fuzzy uncertainty deals with situations where boundaries of the sets under consideration are not sharply defined--partial occurrence of an event. On the other hand, for probabilistic and nonspecific uncertainties there is no ambiguity about set-boundaries, but rather, about the belongingness of elements or events to crisp sets. The present study confines itself only to non-fuzzy uncertainties. The literature is quite rich on fuzzy uncertainty; interested readers may refer to [1] [2] [3] [4] .
Intuitively one feels that uncertainty due to nonspecificity is related to probabilistic uncertainty. It is very difficult to look at either of them in isolation. For example, when belief values are assigned only to singleton elements, there is no uncertainty due to nonspecificity, only randomness may be present. But if a belief value is assigned to a set with cardinality more than one, then there is only nonspecificity. On the other hand, when belief values are assigned to more than one set that are not singletons, one faces both randomness and nonspecificity.
In our discussion, we restrict ourselves to a finite reference set X, and an unknown element x belonging to X. It is also assumed that all information about the belongingness of x to X, if available, is expressible in the language of the Dempster-Shafer [5] theory of evidence. Several authors have suggested different measures for uncertainty. Yager [6] proposed a measure called dissonance or conflict, while Hohle [7, 8] Uncertainty Measures I 167 suggested a measure to quantify the level of confusion present in a body of evidence. Smets [9] suggested a different type of measure for the information content of an evidence. Unlike the measures of Yager [6] and Hohle [7, 8] , the measure of Smets is not a generalization of Shannon's entropy. Higashi and Klir [10] proposed a measures of nonspecificity for a possibility distribution that was later extended to any body of evidence by Dubois and Prade [11] . Recently Klir and Ramer [12] pointed out some limitations of the measure of conflict (confusion) of Hohle [7, 8] , and suggested a new measure for the same. We give an example which shows that this measure also leads to an unappealing situation, and we prove several theorems on different nonspecificity measures.
Lamata and Moral [13] proposed two composite measures, called global uncertainty measures, that attempt to quantify both the probabilistic and nonspecific aspects of uncertainty. One of their measures simply adds the dissonance measure of Yager to the nonspecificity measure of Dubois and Prade; whereas the other one is introduced via definition without prior motivation or justification. Klir and Ramer subsequently suggested another composite measure called total uncertainty that is defined as the sum of Dubois and Prade's nonspecificity and a new measure of conflict called discord [12] . Composite measures reflect some interesting aspects of uncertainty, but analysis reveals that they can lead to intuitively unappealing situations when interpreted as total uncertainty. For example, all of these composite measures have several maxima, which makes it difficult to gauge the quality of evidence based on their numerical values. Moreover, the computational overhead for each of these measures is high. Finally, and most importantly, elementary measures of nonspecificity or probabilistic uncertainty such as dissonance, discord, or nonspecificity attempt to measure only one of the two aspects of non-fuzzy uncertainty, so interpretation of a composite measure such as the total or global uncertainty is difficult. Aggregation of elementary measures may depend on the mode of interaction between different aspects of uncertainty represented by the components in the sum. Because nonspecificity and randomness are related in an unknown way, it does not seem desirable to add expressions for these measures directly to get a measure for total uncertainty.
In Part I of this paper we evaluate existing measures of uncertainty and prove several new properties about some of them. We show that existing measures cannot model situations when no evidence is better than inconsistent evidence. To elucidate this point, consider the following two situations: First, an expert is completely ignorant about the unknown element (because of insufficient or no evidence), and the confidence (belief) assigned to the universal set X is 1; and second, based on the evidence, an expert assigns a belief value of 1//(2 ~ -1) to each of the possible nonempty subsets of X. In the former case, the expert is confident about his or her ignorance; whereas in the latter case, the expert seems confused. Because the basic assignment in the second case is expected to be inconsistent, the total uncertainty in the second case should be larger than in the first case. However, none of the existing measures support this position.
All of the problems itemized above motivate us to look for a new measure of average total uncertainty. Our approach will be to postulate a set of axioms that seem desirable for any measure of total uncertainty--as opposed to axioms related to only one component in a composite sum--and then to derive a function that satisfies the axioms. The measure of total uncertainty we discover will account for the expert's dilemma given above. Several theoretical properties of the new measure are studied, and a numerical example is given that affords an empirical comparison with previous measures. Unlike other measures of total uncertainty, the new measure has a unique maximum. Shannon's probabilistic entropy and Hartley's entropy are shown to be special cases of our measure. Finally, we show that the new measure is computationally more tractable than previous measures.
BASIC TERMINOLOGY
In this section we introduce the basic terminology and definitions of the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. Let X be a finite universe of discourse, IXI = n, e(x) the power set of X, and x any element in X. All information about the belongingness of x to X is expressible by a basic probability assignment (BPA) function m: P(X) ~ [0, 1] that satisfies:
and 
MEASURES OF UNCERTAINTY
This section reviews some extant measures for each of the two different aspects of non-fuzzy uncertainty, namely, nonspecificity and conflict/confusion/discord. Table 1 summarizes different existing measures.
The word "probabilistic" in column three of Table 1 does not necessarily indicate a function of a probability distribution. It is used to indicate that part of the overall uncertainty which is due to randomness or chance. Let M~ denote the set of all basic assignments on the power set with 2 ~ elements. A measures of uncertainty is a mapping S: M~ ~ [0, oo) that satisfies some intuitive notion of uncertainty. In what follows we use Log to specify logarithms to some base a > 1. Usually, a = 2 or a = e; different writers have used different bases. However, because a change of base amounts to a multiplicative constant, we omit the base unless clarity demands it.
Yager [6, 15] proposed the following measure of dissonance (conflict) in a body of evidence:
A~F
This measure is based on the following interpretation of conflicting evidence: whenever the evidence suggests that the element of concern may belong to either of two or more disjoint subsets, then we have conflicting evidence. In [6, 15] Yager introduced the concept of specificity associated with a possibility distribution. For a normalized possibility distribution r specificity is defined as
where r~ = {xJ r(x) >__ a, x ~ X} and ]* I denotes set cardinality. S(r) estimates the precision of a fuzzy set--in other words, it quantifies the extent to which a fuzzy set restricts a small number of values for a variable. A probabilistic interpretation of S is given in [11] . This measure of specificity was subsequently extended (generalized) by Yager [6] 
is viewed as a measure of nonspecificity. Properties of these measures have been investigated by several authors and can be found in [6, 13, 15, 16] . Hohle [7, 8] proposed the following measure of confusion:
A~F C purports to represent the conflict that arises when two evidential claims m(A) and m(B) conflict within the same body of evidence and when B ¢ A. Properties of E, N and C have been studied by Dubois and Prade [16] . Higashi and Klir [10] derived a measure of nonspecificity (called U-uncertainty) for possibility distributions based on a set of desirable axioms. U-uncertainty was proposed to be the possibilistic counter part of Shannon's entropy and at the same time, a generalization of the Hartley information measure. U-uncertainty is thus derived so as to satisfy all properties of Shannon's entropy for which possibilistic counterparts are meaningful, as well as to generalize Hartley's information. U-uncertainty for an ordered possibility distribution [1] is given by:
Recall that A i = {xl, x 2 ..... Xi}; Pi ----r(xi), r is the possibility distribution function and Pn+l = 0. Since Pi -Pi+l = m(Zi), where m is the BPA associated with the possibility distribution, the expression for U(r) can be rewritten as; 
Lamata and Moral [13] point out that measures like (11) are difficult to extend (or generalize) to a more general class of fuzzy measures because such a measure is defined in terms of a BPA, and, for example, in the case of ordered fuzzy measures there is no function similar to the BPA. We add here that extension of measures such as I or E to any fuzzy measure may in fact be entirely disconnected from the idea of uncertainty assessment in the context of evidential reasoning. To circumvent this problem Lamata and Moral suggested a second expression for global uncertainty:
G2(m ) = EVBel(f) , where for any a ~ X,
and
is the expected value of f with respect to Bel--in fact, however, G 2 does not circumvent the problem identified by Lamata and Moral, because it is also defined in terms of a BPA. The expression for G2(m) can be decomposed and rewritten as
G2(m ) = V(m) + W(m),
where V(m) = EVBel(-Log( PI({x}))); (16) 
where
Con(A)= ~_, [m(B)[B-AI/IBI]

B~F
Klir and Ramer suggest that Con(A) expresses the sum of individual conflicts of evidential claims with respect to a particular set A, each of which is properly scaled by the degree to which the containment B c_ A is violated. Equation (18) can be simplified to the following form [12] :
D(m) = -A~Fm( A)L°g[ ~-" rn( B)[A N
Klir and Ramer then defined total uncertainty as:
T(m) = D(m) + l(m).
Comparing (21) and (12), we see that I is common to both 
EB~Fm(B)(]A-BI/IAI). However, with the new definition one gets
Con(A) = 0.4 Con(B) --0.13. Thus (19) (hence (20) too) still seems to be an unappealing measure of conflict. A different type of information measure was proposed by Smets in [9] . His information measure is based on a set of five desirable properties, of which the most important was additivity. Here additivity means that the information content from two distinct, nonconflictual evidences is the sum of the information content of each evidence. Smets' measure takes the form:
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L(m) = -Y'~ LogCm(A). (22)
A cc_X
If the belief structure is non-dogmatic (m(X) > 0), then Cm(A) > 0 for all A ___ X and L is well defined; otherwise L is undefined. L is not a generalization of Shannon's entropy; for a Bayesian belief structure it does not reduce to Shannon's probabilistic entropy, rather, it is undefined. Smets did not provide a satisfactory interpretation of L in the context of uncertainty measurement, and because all of the other measures (that deal with randomness) discussed so far represent some kind of average (expected) values, whereas L does not, our subsequent discussion will ignore this measure.
SOME NEW PROPERTIES OF NONSPECIFICITY MEASURES
In the following theorems, we assume IX] = n. Let F k ___ F such that 
~_, Y'~ m(A)Log[kl = ~_, Log(k) Y'. m(A)
Because the last expression remains fixed on redistribution of m provided the Pk are fixed over, Fk, the theorem follows. Proofs for J and W are similar.
• = 0.75). According to Yager specificity relates to the degree to which the evidence is pointing to a one element realization [6] . In other words, it represents the average mass per element. In this spirit, Theorem 1 and the above observation are quite natural. However, nonspecificity gives an intuitive notion of lack of specification/preciseness (or inability to specify the correct element) that is connected to the uncertainty due to randomness in some unknown fashion. Under this interpretation, the result •
THEOREM 5 W is maximum (W(m)= Log(n)) if and only if m is a vacuous belief function.
Proof W is maximum when EA~Fm(A)IA] is maximum. Because Em(A) = 1 and the maximum IAI is n, ~A~Fm(A)IAI < n. If m is vacuous, then m(X) = 1 and Ea ~ Fm(A)IAI = n, so W attains the maximum value of Log(n). Conversely, suppose W is maximum, ie, Ea ~ em(A)lAI = n. Then m(X) = 1, because if m(X) ~ 1 then there is at least one A ~ F, such that IA[ < n, and hence EA~Fm(A)IAI < n (contradiction).
•
SOME COMMENTS ON COMPOSITE MEASURES T, G~ AND G 2
This section investigates the extent to which the composite measures T, G 1 and G z conform to intuitive notions of total uncertainty. We begin with an example.
EXAMPLE 3 Define seven basic probability assignment functions on X = {1, 2, 3, 4} as follows:
1. Based on our intuitive feeling about total uncertainty we offer the following comments. Clearly there is no uncertainty associated with rn 1. For m2, the total uncertainty is due purely to nonspecificity, (randomness is absent). the basic assignment function is uniformly distributed on P(X). m 7 also concentrates on all elements of P(X) but the belief value attached to a set is proportional to its cardinality. This increases the nonspecificity of m7, which distributes both randomness and nonspecificity uniformly over the largest possible set of focal elements. What happens in Example 3 when TU is computed using equations (12), (15) and (21)?
The second and third columns of Table 2 list the values of global uncertainty as suggested by Lamata and Moral, whereas the fourth column displays the values of total uncertainty as given by the function of Klir and Ramer for the seven BPAs of Example 3. Table 2 reveals that none of these measures conforms to our intuitive desire regarding the inequalities
TU(m 1) < TU(rn 2) = TU(m3) < TU(m 4) < TU(m 5) < TU(m 6) < TU(m 7)
about total uncertainty. Note also that G 2 and T are identical on all seven BPAs, so in this example there is no quantitative difference 
COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF T AND G z
Computational problems in the framework of the theory of evidence are well known [17, 18] . This section compares the computational complexity of T and G t when only the basic assignment function, rn is available. We assume that IF[ = N, ie, rn focuses on N subsets. The total number of logarithmic evaluations, multiplications and additions (the exact number might vary depending on implementation) are summarized in Table 3 (totals are computed ignoring extra overhead in Logarithm evaluation).
We have not considered G 2 because the total number of operations for it is a function of n, the cardinality of IX[, whereas for T and G1 it is a function of N. Hence it is difficult to compare the computational overhead of G 2 to that of T and GI. Moreover, it is difficult to find an expression for the total computations involved in an evaluation of G 2. From Table 3 one sees that the computational overhead for both G~ and T is substantial. The number of logarithmic evaluations are the same for both functions. If we assume that multiplication and addition require the same amount of time, then G 1 and T involve (N 2 + 2N -1) and (3N 2 + 2N -1) additions, respectively. Hence, G 1 and T are both O(N z) procedures. Thus, when the number of possibilities is n, N may be as high as 2 ~ -1, indicating excessive computation for both G 1 and T.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
Limitations of some existing measures of the probabilistic and nonspecific components of non-fuzzy uncertainty that have been used in evidential reasoning were examined. The measures of conflict discussed in section 3 cannot account for complete uncertainty (ignorance) that arises We discussed three composite measures of total and global uncertainty. Lamata and Moral defined a global measures of uncertainty (G~) as the sum of Yager's measure of dissonance (E) and the nonspecificity measure (I) of Dubois and Prade. They also defined a second measure of global uncertainty (G 2) as the sum of a measure of innate contradiction (V) and a measure of imprecision (W). Klir and Ramer defined total uncertainty (T) as the sum of I and a new measure of conflict (D). We have established by examples and theorems that all of these composite measures result in intuitively unappealing situations. None of G 1, G 2 nor T has a unique maximum; hence, it is difficult to interpret (visualize) the ambiguity present in the system reflected by values of Gl, G 2 and T. G~ and T do quantify some interesting aspects of uncertainty, but the name total (or global) uncertainty does not seem appropriate for either of them, because conflict and nonspecificity represent different aspects of non-fuzzy uncertainty, so there is no sound rationale for simply adding them together to assess the total uncertainty of a BPA. Computational overhead, an important consideration in evidential reasoning, may be quite large for G 1 and T.
Since the probabilistic and nonspecific components of total uncertainty are coupled in an unknown manner it seems better to look at total uncertainty as a whole, rather than as a sum of conflict and nonspecificity.
Along with all of the problems of composite measures itemized above, this fact motivates us to look for a new measure of average total uncertainty. Our approach in Part II of this paper will be to postulate a set of axioms that seem desirable for any measure of total uncertainty (as opposed to axioms related to only one component in a composite sum); and then to derive a function that satisfies these axioms.
